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NEED FOR CONTINUED ECONOMIC REGULATION
OF AIR TRANSPORT
MELVIN

A. BRENNER*

N THE abstract, it is easy to be against government regulation.
One of the most cherished concepts in the American economy
is that of the free, competitive marketplace. Absent special circumstances, Government intervention into that marketplace is normally undesirable. Yet, it has long been recognized that certain industries (including particularly transportation) can best serve the
public when regulation does influence the competitive environment.
Air transport was recognized to belong in this category early in
its history; recent debate has challenged whether economic regulation of this industry is still needed. From many standpoints, one
can sincerely wish that regulation were indeed no longer required.
To an airline, there are many frustrations in not being able to fly
freely wherever we'd like, in not being able to charge whatever
prices we'd like, in having to get special approval for a variety of
actions. The alternative to economic regulation of this industry,
however, would be enormous economic waste. Both the airlines
and the public would suffer. Hundreds of millions of gallons of
fuel would be wasted each year. The public would get more air
service than it needs on some popular routes and less than it needs
(or none at all) on others. Airlines would lose even their present
limited appeal to investors, and would be unable to raise capital
for future progress.
Why would deregulation have these effects for the airlines, when
most industries prosper without regulation? Simply because the
airlines have unique elements in their supply-demand equation,
such that unrestrained competition will lead inevitably to overcapacity. The airline industry does not conform to the classic eco* Vice President-Marketing Planning, Trans World Airlines, Inc.
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nomic theories under which the factors of supply and demand
interact in a manner to produce a self-adjusting equilibrium. We
have a built-in tendency toward overcapacity, and that tendency
would be greatly intensified if competition were totally unrestrained.
The stakes are high. In 1974, the domestic trunks flew nearly
two seats for every one passenger carried. If we could have eliminated even ten percent of the empty seats, that alone would have
saved 300 million gallons of fuel, and $200 million of operating
cost. Our excess empty seats resulted from the fact that we are
already highly competitive. Nearly eighty percent of the city-pair
routes already have directly paralleling competition. Indeed, a popular criticism of this industry is that we are too competitive in
scheduling, too competitive in meals and in-flight amenities, too
competitive in acquiring too many of the very latest aircraft types,
etc. Thus, the issue is not whether there should be competition in
air service; the issue is whether today's substantial but regulated
competition should be replaced with even more substantial, unregulated competition.
I stated above that we don't conform to the normal laws of supply/demand equilibrium. Let's see why.
I.

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF SUPPLY/DEMAND

EQUATION

IN SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORT

There are several unique factors affecting airline capacity:
1. Our service must be produced at the very instant it is being
consumed, with no ability whatever to store any surplus in
inventory.
2. Schedule frequency in itself has great competitive value, creating strong marketing pressure for increased volume of output as an objective in its own right.
3. We have substantial "fixed" costs, creating pressure to add
capacity on the basis of recovering just variable, out-of-pocket costs, without recovering fully allocated cost.
No other industry encounters all three factors in the same degree.
We will discuss below how these factors generate overcapacity under competitive conditions.
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A. InseparableLinkage of Production and Consumption
For most industries, production and consumption are two distinct functions-separated by time and geography. A manufacturer turns out his product when, where, and at production rates
that he finds most appropriate. His distribution pipeline then acts
as the "valve" that adjusts the flow of that product to individual
markets at rates related to varying local consumption. If a given
community consumes one hundred units per day, the manufacturer
does not have to ship two hundred each day.
In air transport, on the other hand, production and consumption occur inseparably at the very same instant of time. If we are
to have any service between City A and City B on a given day, we
must produce, on that day, the irreducible quantity of seats that
is represented by a full plane-load of capacity. For most present
trunk airline service, the minimum aircraft size is close to or over
one hundred seats, and on some routes the competitive norm is a
wide-body plane of 230 or more seats.
Perhaps we expect an average of only fifty passengers daily to fly
from City A to City B in the month of October. Yet, if we are to
maintain nonstop service on that route, we cannot slice a part of
a plane; we cannot use a distribution "pipeline" to ship only part
of a production run; we must fly our minimum plane-size of close
to or over one hundred seats. And any seats that are unsold when
that plane leaves the gate are permanently wasted; there is no inventory to which they can be assigned. Adam Smith was not dealing with a supply/demand situation with these substantial inflexibilities.
The difficulty of getting a close "fit" between the inflexible planeload of seats, and the individual market size, is complicated by the
competitive pressure to serve so many city-pairs on a direct pointto-point nonstop basis, with correspondingly diminished opportunity to use one-stop and multi-stop routings to build up "traffic
flows." This creates a special problem for the airline capacity planner, unparalleled in surface transport, where it would be unthinkable to by-pass so many of the intermediate and connecting
points that generate traffic flow. With only a few top exceptions,
the point-to-point traffic moving locally between two cities is comparatively small in relation to the size of modern transport air-
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craft. For example, the total industry O&D traffic between the
second largest city in the east (Philadelphia) and the second
largest city in the west (San Francisco) was only 208 passengers
daily each way in 1974. A single daily 747 schedule could have
handled this entire market, with forty-three percent of the seats
left over.
The smaller the market size in relation to available aircraft size,
the greater the difficulty of adjusting capacity so as to minimize the,
waste of empty seats. For example, when even one daily frequency
provides more seats than are needed, a carrier has no opportunity
to fine-tune its capacity level, since the seats on that one trip obviously cannot be "shaved" by five percent, or ten percent, or twenty percent to get some desired load factor.
In this context, one immediate effect of increasing the amount
of competition on a route is to further subdivide the market size,
so that the average market available to each carrier gets smaller
and smaller in relation to aircraft size. And, as noted above, this
renders more difficult the task of "fitting" supply to demand. But
beyond this, competition in air service provides special pressures
for more frequencies, as discussed in the following section.
B. Increased Competitive Output Means More Sales
In other industries, a supplier cannot increase the consumer appeal of his product merely by producing more of it. In air transportation he can. If, for example, TWA produces twice as many
seats as our competitors betwen New York and Los Angeles,
that increase in production will, in itself, generate more sales for
TWA.
The competitive value of merely increasing production is inherent in the nature of our service. Our customers are not seeking
transportation from City A to City B in the abstract. They have
very definite preferences as to the time of day at which they want
to leave. And, in metropolitan areas with more than one airport,
passengers also have preferences as to the airport for their departure. A carrier that operates more schedule frequencies on a route
can offer a wider choice of departure times, and/or more full coverage of the several metropolitan airports. This carrier will thus
have competitive appeal to a larger part of the total market on
that route. This fact has often been recognized. The Civil Aero-
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nautics Board has stated that "[in] any given market, the carrier
with the greatest number of schedules will normally carry the
largest number of passengers."' Other experts in the aviation industry have acknowledged the relationship between schedule frequency and greater plane load by recognizing that "if a carrier unilaterally increases its schedule frequency, it can expect to divert
passengers from other air carriers, if the other carriers do not
match the increase."' Thus, the very nature of what we sell attaches
a special competitive value to increased output per se.
Surveys of air passengers consistenlyt show thatthe single most
important factor in selection of an airline is the availability of a
schedule closest to the passenger's individual departure time preference. The competitive importance of departure time explains capacity actions which are common in air transport, and yet which
would be inexplicable by the standards of other industries. For
example, it would normally be unheard of for a supplier to increase his production rate if he is currently selling only a fraction
of his present output. In air transportation this is common. Two
carriers on a route may each have morning and evening departures, with only half of those existing seats now occupied. Yet if
one of those carriers were to add a new trip at noon, he would
expect to divert from his competitor those passengers who prefer
to leave at that time of day. And so, even though there are already ample seats in the market, there will nevertheless be competitive pressure to add more.
This competitive pressure would not in itself lead to so much
waste of capacity were it not for the inflexibilities of our production units as described in the preceding section. If the addition of
a new trip at noon could simply be offset by a corresponding reduction of seats at other hours, this would not necessarily lead to
excess capacity. But our planes cannot be shrunk in size. Therefore, the addition of seats at a new departure time cannot realistically be offset by shrinking the size of the units at other departure times. Hence, competitive pressure for frequency does lead
to excess seats.
The above comments relate to the competitive value of flight freCAB,
'G.

DECISION IN PHASE
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DPFI, at 5 (1971).

DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANS-

PORT 44 (Brookings Inst., 1974).
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quency as this leads to excess capacity. Since 1970, there has
been another dimension to the competitive value of increased capacity-i.e., the sales attraction of increased aircraft size with widebody jets.
An L-10 11 is not just a plane that provides twice as many seats
as a 707. It is also a plane that is competitively more attractive
than the 707. Under conditions of competition, this creates still another incentive to add seats at a faster rate than would be needed
just to satisfy quantitatively the growth in the market. Often a carrier will double its seats on a route by upgrading to wide-body
equipment-not because traffic has doubled to require that number of seats-but rather because the qualitative appeal of that
equipment will attract passengers from competitors.
In short, competition in air service provides a definite pressure
to increase production for its own sake. Whether it takes the form
of more frequency, or wide-body planes, greater production means
greater competitive sales. In this respect, we are quite different
from other industries, and face this major distorting influence in
our supply/demand equation.
C. Airline Cost Structure
The above factors explain the pressures for increasing capacity
in competitive air transportation; they do not yet explain, however,
why this pressure carries the industry to capacity levels beyond
those which are economically sound. Even with competition, why
does airline management stop short of that increment of capacity
which would fail to cover its cost, and hence be unprofitable?
Pressure to add capacity beyond the point of economical soundness results from the nature of our cost structure. A substantial
part of our total cost consists of fixed or overhead elements which
are not materially affected by whether a particular schedule is or
is not operated. These fixed costs include such elements as the investment in our overhaul base, the rent paid for airport terminal
facilities, or the capital cost of our computerized reservation system. These costs (accounting in the aggregate for nearly forty
percent of our overall costs) will not be significantly affected by
the addition or deletion of any one trip. Therefore, a decision on
the merits of adding that trip will usually be based upon the incre-
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mental variable costs directly incurred by that trip-such out-ofpocket costs as fuel and oil, crew pay, landing fees, etc.
The decisional process for escalating frequency will usually go
as follows:
• Carrier A sees an opportunity to move ahead of competitors
with an added trip, and calculates that the incremental traffic
(and revenue) diverted from competitors will more than cover the incremental variable costs of operating this new capacity.
" Sooner or later, Carrier B and/or Carrier C conclude that if
they match the added trip of Carrier A, they will regain the
traffic initially lost to the aggressive carrier, and that this retrieved revenue would incrementally more than cover the
variable cost of their adding this new capacity.
Thus, the see-saw of capacity involves, first, initiation, and then
competitive response, based upon variable cost breakeven. As this
escalation goes on, the overall average load factor drops below
the level needed to cover the full allocation of all costs, and drifts
closer to mere variable cost breakeven. The aggregate effect of
this chain reaction produces more capacity than is economically
sound, since it produces a load factor inadequate to cover fully
allocated cost.
A route like Chicago-Los Angeles provides graphic evidence of
what this process produces. This is one of the few long-haul routes
with high traffic density; indeed, it ranks third among such routes.
In 1974, its average traffic flow amounted to 2050 passengers
daily each way. This traffic density should have given it the inherent potential for favorable load factors. For reasons discussed
earlier, the problem of getting a close "fit" between our capacity
units and market demand should be eased where there is a high
density of traffic.
The Chicago-Los Angeles is, however, also one of the most
competitive routes-with four unrestricted carriers operating on it.
And here is the recent record of capacity and load factors on this
route:
• In the six months ended March 1975 the average four-carrier
load factor was only forty-three percent.
" Despite those poor load factors, industry capacity in the sec-
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ond quarter of 1975 was increased by six percent over the
preceding year. In the third quarter it was increased by seven percent. And in the fourth quarter it was increased by
eleven percent.
" As a result, prior to United's strike in December, the industry load factors stayed below forty-five percent during all but
four months of 1975.
* Moreover, the individual airline with the lowest load factor
on the route (less than thirty-three percent for the six months
ended March 1975) implemented the largest increase in capacity (a thirty percent jump in seats in the fourth quarter of
1975).
There is no way that this type of capacity behavior can be reconciled with the simple, classical, theories of supply and demand. In
any other industry, it would be unthinkable for a firm that had
been selling only one-third of its output to then increase its rate
of output by over thirty percent. But because of the factors discussed above, this is indeed the way in which competition generates pressures for over-capacity in air transport.

II.

EVIDENCE OF COMPETITIVE OVER-CAPACITY

More generalized evidence of the effect of competition is provided by Table 1, which shows the load factor results in 1972 for
all significant non-stop routes, broken down by degree of competition. These data were developed by CAB staff in its study on the
domestic route system.
Segments served by only one carrier had higher average load
factors than segments with two carriers, and the latter had higher
load factors than those with three or more carriers. But this in itself understates the impact of increasing competition. For Table 1
also indicates that the greater amounts of competition have been
authorized on the routes with higher traffic volume. For example,
the routes with three or more carriers have generally been those
connecting the largest metropolitan areas. Table 1 indicates that
the three-carrier markets have average traffic density seven times
larger than the one-carrier markets. We have previously pointed
out that greater traffic density provides the potential for better
capacity-fit, and hence higher load factor. Yet, while enjoying
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much larger traffic density, the three-carrier markets averaged
lower load factors. The explanation, of course, is that their greater
amounts of competition more than offset their density-related potential for better load factors.
TABLE 1
LOAD FACTOR EFFECT OF INCREASED COMPETITION
Number of Carriers
in Market

1972
Load
Factor

Average
Traffic Density per Market
(Daily Passengers Each Way)

One Carrier
55%
75
Two Carriers
52
237
Three or More Carriers
50
536
Source: The Domestic Route System, Staff Study of CAB Bureau of
Operating Rights, October 1974, Pages 77 and 83.
Existing levels of authorized competition have made it chronically difficult for this industry to avoid excess capacity. The most
recent proof is the industry's inability to achieve the CAB's load
factor standard in over four years of effort to do so. This takes on
special significance in view of the CAB's repeated warnings that
fares would be set so that attainment of adequate earnings would
be dependent upon achieving the Board's load factor standard. Yet,
despite this strong financial incentive to avoid excess capacity,
competitive pressures have continued to make this goal unattainable.
When the CAB approved a small domestic fare increase late in
1975, this was granted only after first disallowing the equivalent of
almost one billion dollars in annual operating expenses, and just under nine hudred million dollars in capacity investment, as being excessive, because those costs related to capacity beyond that needed
under the Board's standards. Obviously, if there were the meaningful option to do so, this industry would have cut back capacity
to achieve the CAB standards, thus avoiding these high disallowances. The industry's inability to do so gets back to the preceding
discussion as to capacity inflexibilities under competition conditions.
Interestingly, even those who argue for more competition do
not'challenge the fact that existing competition now leads to depressed load factors and wasted space. Thus:
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[T]he airlines tend to compete on the basis of scheduling, over
which the Board does not exercise direct control. The result is excess capacity . . .(emphasis added).'
Nonprice competition, by causing unduly low load factors and aircraft configured, to low density seating, has artificially raised the
cost of air travel" (emphasis added).'
The deregulators claim that low avearage load factors .. .are a
function of (i) demand-related rather than cost-determined fares
and (ii) the carriers' reliance on scheduling competition, which
they [the deregulators] claim leads to excess capacity (emphasis
added) .'
III.

THE THEORY THAT PRICING FREEDOM CAN OBVIATE
PRESSURE FOR SCHEDULING COMPETITION

Those who favor deregulation surely do not consciously seek to
create still more excess capacity. Yet, simple logic would suggest
that, if the existing level of competition has created too many
seats, totally unrestrained competition would create still more empty seats. How do the advocates of deregulation resist this conclusion? How do they argue that more competition would mean less
excess capacity?
Their position rests on the theory that present excess capacity
has resulted, not from the existence of competition, but rather
from the form that competition now takes. They claim that the
present regulatory framework precludes price competition, and
has forced competition into "non-price" channels, including particularly schedule capacity. Thus we find Messrs. Douglas and
Miller stating:
Essentially, therefore, airline firms rival each other primarily in
non-price, quality dimensions ...of greatest importance in nonprice rivalry is the tendency of firms to compete on scheduling and
capacity (emphasis added).'
From this basic proposition, this theory further argues that a deregulated environment would provide freedom for price competition, and that carriers would then no longer have to engage in such
1975 COUN. OF ECON. ADV. ANN. REP. 154.
'

CAB,

STAFF STUDY ON REGULATION REFORM

17 (1975).

5 HARBRIDGE HOUSE, STUDY ON DEREGULATION EXPERIMENT
DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 2, at 43.

27 (1975).
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non-price forms of rivalry as schedule frequency wars. The CAB
Special Staff study stated:
[I]n the absence of entry and price regulation, a new firm with a
limited schedule could compete with incumbent carriers on the
basis of a lower price.7
This theory is the only one that attempts to overcome the logical
dilemma of conceding that today's competition produces excess
capacity, while claiming that tomorrow's deregulated competition
would not. Thus a basic question is whether indeed one can realistically expect freedom of price competition to serve as a substitute
for competing in the ways which are now familiar, including via
schedule frequency.
We shall demonstrate that the above theory is invalid.
The advocates of deregulation obviously contemplate that pricing freedom would result in price differentiation between carriers
-in other words, that rivalry in price would take the place of the
present emphasis on rivalry in non-price matters. But this misses
the point of why there is virtually no price differentiation among
carriers today.
The present uniformity of fares is not the result of CAB regulatory fiat. For example, the CAB has never compelled carriers
to match promotional discount fares initiated by their competitors.
Yet, such promotional fares are almost always matched, voluntarily.
The reason why airlines generally have uniform fares is not because
the CAB tells us we must, but rather because the marketplace tells
us we must. And this uniformity is a marketplace necessity because of the substantial similarity in the basic elements of the
product offered by competing carriers.
Operating the same or similar aircraft, out of the same airports, over the same airways-airlines do not have many elements
of visible, tangible, differentiation vis-a-vis competitors. One of the
greatest challenges for any airline management is to establish such
product differentiation in meaningful fashion. Many of the elements in which differences do exist are, by their nature, subjective
and difficult to prove to a skeptical consumer (e.g., the degree of
friendliness and courtesy of personnel, or the superior quality of
an in-flight meal). Almost in desperation, airlines sometimes resort
T

CAB, supra note 4, at 116.
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to so-called "frills" (such as free champagne) in an effort to find
tangible elements of product differentiation.
In this marketing context, a fare difference of even a few dollars
would become a highly visible and tangible sales advantage. For
that very reason, no airline can afford to concede to its competitor
this marketing advantage. To avoid this, carriers match competitors' fare reductions-voluntarily--even when they violently disagree with their basic economic rationale. (Example: Eastern and
Delta strongly disagreed with the National "No Frills" fare, but
nevertheless joined it.) A carrier usually finds it less costly to
match an uneconomic fare, and thus remain competitive, rather
than to forego such fare and lose the market.
Against this background, let us now consider the implications
of the above-described deregulation theory of pricing freedom. It
assumes that a carrier would be able to resist competing on schedule frequency by reducing its fare instead. For this to be a meaningful option, one must assume that the carrier with the more aggressive schedule would hold fast to the original fare level, and
thus hand over to the schedule-restrained carrier the competitive
advantage of an exclusively lower fare.
No one familiar with this industry would expect so unlikely a
scenario. In the real world, the carrier that is sufficiently aggressive to operate more frequently on the route would also be aggressive enough to match its competitor's lower fare. And once
matched, fares would be no more differentiated than they are today, and the importance of so-called "non-price" rivalry (including schedule frequency) would remain as great as it is today. Thus,
the theory relied upon to avoid greater excess capacity under deregulation rests on quicksand. More competition would mean more
pressure for more empty seats.
IV.

MAGNITUDE OF POTENTIAL WASTE UNDER DEREGULATION

The resources consumed in modem air transport operation are
great. The operation of even one daily L-1011 coast-to-coast
roundtrip consumes over nine million gallons of fuel per year, and
incurs a fully allocated cost of nearly fourteen million dollars per
year. The deregulation advocates have not provided any forecast
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of what their proposed environment might generate in the way of
added capacity.
Let us get at least an order-of-magnitude perspective by taking
a conservative set of assumptions. Let us assume that under a deregulation environment, there were just one new carrier deciding to
operate on each of the twenty-five leading segments in the country. Let us further assume that this one extra carrier on each of
these routes chose to enter with a very restrained capacity level,
i.e., operating only half as much capacity as the leading incumbent carrier on the route.
This illustration is obviously conservative in several ways-by
considering only twenty-five routes, by assuming only one new
carrier on each route, and by assuming a restrained entry level of
capacity. But even under these conservative assumptions, there
would be great waste. This conservative scenario would involve
fully allocated costs of $475 million per year, incremental variable costs of nearly $300 million, and added fuel consumption of
450 million gallons per year. Incidentally, to place the added fuel
consumption in perspective-this would be enough to negate totally
the conservation efforts of 6 2 million motorists, if each curtailed
his annual driving by ten percent.
V. DEREGULATION WOULD DESTROY ANY CHANCE FOR
AN OVERALL ROUNDED AIR TRANSPORT NETWORK

The impact of deregulation would not stop with the private interests of airlines' share-holders, but would just as surely affect adversely the interest of the general public in having a total, wellrounded air network of service.
A basic reason for economic regulation of any form of transportation is to help protect the stronger routes against undue competitive erosion of their strength so that their above-average earning potential can help support the more marginal routes, which are
also needed by the public. This is a fundamental premise of regulation, whether it be for a local urban transit system, or a coastto-coast airline.
The need for this economic regulation gets back to a basic
characteristic previously described, i.e., the inflexibilities growing
out of the simultaneous consumption and production of our serv-
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ice. Our market sizes vary enormously. While an average of 2341
passengers travel daily each way between New York and Chicago,
there are only 213 travelling between New York and Phoenix,
and only 81 between New York and Tulsa.
In other industries, market sizes also vary, of course, but there
the separation of production and consumption makes it possible
to ship to a given market the precise quantity desired, regardless
of the size of an efficient "production run" at the factory. But in
air transport, our minimum "production run" is a planeload of
seats, and that is the quantity of seats that must be "shipped" to
a given market, even if only a fraction of those seats are needed
in that market on a given day.
When this inflexibility of our supply is applied to the enormous
variety of our demand element, we unavoidably get wide variation
in profitability. It is impossible in these circumstances to expect
every route to be equally self-sufficient-or even to expect the
very same route to be equally self-sufficient from one flight departure to the next, or from one day to the next, or from one season
to the next. The fact that a given route at a given time is not fully
profitable is no onus for that route, or for the communities involved. Nor does it imply that the passengers travelling over that
route are "charity" cases, being unreasonably supported by the
passengers on other, more profitable routes. Rather, as in the case
of a local transit system that charges a flat fifty cent fare for all
passengers, it simply recognizes that the total public has an interest in a total transport system, and that an averaging of the results of individual routes is a necessary condition for having adequate service on thin as well as strong routes.
In 1974, TWA's most profitable domestic route made a fully
allocated profit of nine million dollars; but our least profitable
route sustained a fully allocated loss of nine million dollars. In
that same year, though our domestic system as a whole came close
to breaking even, we had ninety-eight route segments which failed
to cover full cost-offset by some fifty segments which more than
covered full cost by a margin adequate to balance out the system at close to breakeven.
The deregulation theorists seek to belittle the need for "crosssubsidy" between strong and weak routes. They say in effect: "We
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don't believe that you have so many unprofitable routes, for if
you did, you'd be seeking to abandon them right now."
Why in fact, don't we just seek to drop the unprofitable segments? This gets back to the nature of our cost structure, previously discussed. Though failing to cover fully allocated costs, these
marginal segments more than cover the variable cost directly associated with their operation. Even though they do not make their
full contribution to supporting fixed and overhead costs, we are
financially better off with them than we would be without them,
since they make at least a partial contribution to fixed costs, most
of which would not disappear even if we abandoned these services.
The fact remains, however, that they do leave a financial shortfall
in relation to fully allocated cost, which must be absorbed by extra
strength somewhere else on our system, or we lack on-going corporate viability.
What would happen if there were no control over entry, and if
every carrier were free to enter whatever routes it chose? The scenario is distressingly simple:
Since every carrier has its share of segments which are providing only variable cost recovery, all carriers would immediately search out opportunities to shift their equipment from
some of their lowest-returning segments, to new routes where
the contribution over variable cost would be better than the
most marginal on its present system.
No carrier could long resist the pressure to move in this direction. As each carrier's own previously profitable segments were
pulled down closer and closer to bare-bones variable-cost recovery, that carrier in turn would have to abandon its own weaker routes in the interest of redeploying its planes to any other
routes where it might get even a somewhat better contribution
over variable costs.
The result: wholesale deterioration of service on thinner routes,
and concentration on the stronger routes to the point at which the
latter would themselves become only marginal.
VI. THE

ISSUE OF THE INDUSTRY'S "MATURITY"

One of the reasons advanced for deregulation is the fact that this
industry has matured substantially since the mid-thirties, when economic regulation was first adopted.
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The degree of maturity of this industry would have relevance to
the issue of deregulation only if those conditions which required
regulation in the first place were strictly related to an "infant-industry" status. However, that is not so. Nobody suggests that the
electric power industry should be deregulated just because it is
mature.
The factors which make it necessary to restrain normal marketplace forces in air transportation are continuing characteristics of
our service, and these factors have not diminished just because we
are now larger. Indeed, in important respects, our greater "maturity" has made the need for economic regulation more, and not less
important. For example, one characteristic of a maturing industry is a leveling off of growth rates. The airlines are indeed experiencing that aspect of a maturing status. In the first thirty years after passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act (i.e., the thirty years ending in 1968), trunk air traffic grew at an average annual rate of
eighteen percent. In the past seven years (since 1968), we have
grown at an average annual rate of less than five percent. This in
itself has considerable significance-not to justify elimination of
economic regulation at this time, but instead to reinforce the continued need for such regulation.
Back in the 1950's and 1960's, when the CAB authorized large
amounts of additional competition, a significant part of its rationale was the so-called "growth offset theory." That theory stated
that the competitive diversion of traffic from incumbent carriers
would not permanently impair those carriers because normal traffic growth would offset this diversion in a relatively few years.
That cornerstone for rationalizing increased competition has surely
become more difficult to rely upon at this time, in view of our
"maturing," and, therefore, our presently less-dramatic growth rates.
When this industry was growing at annual rates of twenty percent,
and more, in the mid-1960's, industry traffic actually doubled itself in less than five years. In contrast with the average growth
rate experienced between 1968 and 1975, it would take sixteen
years for the industry to double its volume. The ability to rely on
growth to offset the inroads of competitive diversion has thus been
sharply diminished with our "maturing" status.
Our greater maturity has also been accompanied by much larger
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aircraft unit size. When this is coupled with flattening growth rates,
it again increases, rather than diminishes, the need for regulating
the amount of competition. For example, with the annual traffic
growth rate of the mid-1960's, and with the largest aircraft then
in use, if each of the three competitors on New York-San Francisco had added one daily 707 schedule apiece on that route in
1967 the then-existing traffice growth would have filled that added
capacity to a fifty-five percent load factor in little over one and a
half years. In contrast, with recent traffic trends, if each carrier
on this route were at this time to add an L-10 11 or DC-10 schedule, and if this market's traffic continued to grow at the rate experienced betwen 1969 and 1974, it would take over fifteen years
to fill this added capacity to the extent of a fifty-five percent load
factor.
This means that our greater maturity in larger aircraft size, and
in slower traffic growth, have reduced the "tolerance" for absorbing the impact of competitive capacity increases. In the mid1960's, if competitive pressures led to the addition of new frequencies prematurely, there was at least the hope that traffic would
grow into the added capacity in a relatively short time. With our
present "more mature" status, the period of time it would take
traffic to grow into added capacity has become substantially elongated-so much so that the industry can go "down the tube"
while waiting for that growth.
VII. THE ISSUE OF REGULATORY OVER-PROTECTION
One of the arguments of advocates of deregulation is that the
CAB has been over-protective of this industry. As a related argument, they allege that this protective environment has blunted normal incentives for maximum efficiency.
Any allegation of CAB over-protection is rebutted by this industry's record of seriously inadequate earnings over several decades (see Table 2). In only two of the last 20 years did the industry earn the rate of return then deemed reasonable by the CAB.
In most years, our return was less than half of the level held to be
reasonable. One would scarcely find such poor earnings, over so
sustained a period, if indeed we had been sheltered by an unduly
benign regulatory force.
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TABLE 2
DOMESTIC TRUNK RETURN ON INVESTMENT AND PROFIT MARGIN

1955-1974
Year

Return On
Investment

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

11.8%
9.4
4.9
6.3
7.3
2.8
1.5
4.1
4.3
10.0
11.2
9.7
6.9
4.9
4.3
1.4
3.3
5.1
4.7
7.8

Profit a
Margin

5.6%
4.6
1.9
3.0
3.4
0
(1.7)
0.4
0.5
4.8
6.8
6.5
5.5
2.5
1.8
(1.6)
0.7
2.4
1.7
3.3

aNet revenue as percent of operating revenue.

Source: Air Transport Association, Annual Reports
Data from 1969 on include 50-state data.
Equally fallacious is the charge that the regulatory climate has
softened normal corporate incentives for efficiency. This allegation
ignores the fact that this industry's environment is one of regulated
competition, and not of regulated monopoly. On the great majority
of the industry's system there are at least two parallel competitors,
and on much of the system there are three or more. Each carrier
knows that, for reasons already discussed, it must maintain prices
that are fully competitive with those of other carriers on the route.
Therefore, with prices the same, each carrier knows that if it can
do a better job of marketing and/or of cost control than its competitors, any edge it gains in load factor or in cost efficiency will
redound to its own profit and loss benefit.
This is a far different situation than the regulated monopoly
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status of the classic public utility, such as an electric power company. In the latter situation, the rate level is set by the regulatory
agency on the basis of the individual firm that in effect operates
"the only game in town." That is essentially a cost-plus situation,
with, understandably, some lingering question whether that type
of rate setting may weaken normal efficiency incentives. But this
most certainly is not the situation in air transport. In our case, any
gain in efficiency will benefit the individual carrier that achieves
it, and, therefore, there is not in fact any softening of normal efficiency incentives merely because we operate in a regulatory environment.
VIII. EFFECT OF DEREGULATION ON ABILITY TO RAISE CAPITAL
FOR FUTURE PROGRESS

If any industry is not to stagnate, it must maintain adequate investor confidence to raise the capital funds needed for investing in
future growth and progress. This need is especially great in air
transport, with its greater-than-average technological dynamics.
Presently, the smallest plane of trunk line size costs approximately
ten million dollars to replace, and if that replacement is with the
more advanced wide-body technology, the cost runs to over twenty
million dollars per replacement unit. Even in the inflation environment of the 1970's, $20 million for a single vehicle is an enormous
investment.
For perspective, a single inter-city bus costs only about $80,000;
a fleet of 250 buses could be acquired for the cost of just one L1011. Every single day, the cost of just owning an L-1011 runs to
over $7000, even if the plane if left idle on the ground. And if
used at even moderate utilization, the fully allocated cost for operating this plane would be roughly ten million dollars per year.
Assume that one of these planes is acquired for a planned 16year depreciable life, and that it must average a fifty-five percent
load factor in order to provide an adequate return on the investment. If, because of a changed competitive environment or any
other unforeseen development, this plane falls even five load factor
points short of fifty-five percent over its useful life, this will translate into an aggregate revenue shortfall of $17 million over the
sixteen-year period. With leverage such as this, any prudent inves-
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tor must insist on more than a casual possibility of using this expensive asset at a profitable load factor before agreeing to lay out
the funds for its acquisition.
As a result of years of inadequate earnings, investor confidence
in the airlines is already at an all-time low. A recent tabulation by
U.S. News and World Report, based upon a survey of investment
brokers, placed airlines at the absolute bottom of a list of eighteen
industries.8 This indicates the low esteem accorded to this industry by investors today. Consider the impossibility of attracting
capital for future investment if, in the face of the large sums and
high leverage noted above, an investor faced the constant possibility of new competitors, in unknown numbers, coming onto the
very route for which a newly-acquired twenty million dollar asset
was planned to be used. As noted, if such new competitors reduced the prospective load factor by even a few percentage points,
this would be enough to make that large investment unprofitable.
Superficially, it may seem of small consequence right now if
further investment in this industry is indeed discouraged. After all,
there seem to be more than enough planes around to handle the
demand for several years into the future. But any such attitude
would be short-sighted in the extreme. For any longer term period
than just the next few years, this industry must have the ability
reasonably to replace, modernize, and expand upon its present productive capacity. Present planes will wear out. Newer planes will
offer greater fuel efficiency, and greater ecological benefits. Over
time, markets will continue to grow.
Today's spectacular air transport development could not have
occurred without the ivestment support of private citizens and financial institutions. And that progress will stagnate if investor confidence is not repaired above its present dismal level.
IX.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

This paper has not argued against competition in air transport;
what it has argued against is the totally unrestrained competition
that would exist with deregulation.
We have pointed out that substantial competition already exists.
And, obviously, the existing regulatory framework provides the
8

U.S.

NEWS & WORLD REPORT,

Dec. 15, 1975 at 29.
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opportunity for the CAB to authorize still more competition in
those specific cases in which the public benefit would more than
balance the costs. We do not claim that the existing pattern of
regulation is perfect. But the direction for needed improvement
can be found only if one starts first with a willingness to understand the underlying forces that make this industry "tick."
Our "supply/demand" equation does not conform to the traditional concepts of classical economics. If free marketplace forces
take over without regulatory constraint, they will inevitably lead
to major over-capacity. The resulting waste would levy a heavy
toll on scarce resources, including fuel. And the public would end
up with massive dislocations of needed public service.
In the very essence of our service, schedule-frequency will always be a major competitive weapon. The more unrestrained the
competition, the more the waste of side-by-side empty seats.
The stakes get higher each year. And our growing "maturity" is
less forgiving of ill-considered over-expansion.
If the public wants assurance of the full range of needed air
services, at lowest cost, it must accept the fact that our underlying
economics are more those of a public utility than of the corner grocery store. And it must accept the consequent need for regulation
of normal marketplace forces.

